Stupid is as Stupid Does
Petrochemical Civilisation and the Production of Lesser Losers and Bigger Losers
1. Introduction: Only Losers, Then Bigger Losers
If modern civilisation is built on petrochemicals, then food production, transport, manufacturing, healthcare, communications and military power all depend upon them. Modern life is not merely supported by petrochemicals. It is organised around them.
Yet the petrochemical industry is barely discussed in mainstream politics, media or social media. Public debate focuses instead on power, economics and war.
The problem is that the defining feature of modern civilisation is not power but dependency. Regardless of wealth, political ideology, economic system or military strength, societies remain dependent upon petrochemical fuels, materials and products for the basic functioning of everyday life. This shared condition changes how power, conflict and advantage should be understood.
Throughout this essay I argue that petrochemical civilisation produces lesser losers and bigger losers.
A lesser loser is a person, institution or country that remains dependent while bearing relatively fewer costs, vulnerabilities or losses. A bigger loser is one that remains dependent while bearing greater costs, vulnerabilities or losses. The difference between them can be substantial, but both remain tied to the same material system.
This perspective casts familiar political and economic debates in a different light. Wars, sanctions, trade disputes, resource competition and geopolitical rivalries are often presented as struggles for power. Yet if all participants remain dependent upon the same petrochemical civilisation, such conflicts may change the distribution of losses without changing the condition that generates them.
Stupid is as stupid does.
The defining stupidity of petrochemical civilisation is not its dependence on petrochemicals. Given their usefulness, affordability and effectiveness, that dependence is understandable. The defining stupidity is the persistent tendency to mistake relative advantage for power itself. Countries may gain territory, resources or influence, and remain dependent upon the same material foundations as their rivals.
The sections that follow develop this argument through an examination of petrochemical dependency, war and the modern pursuit of power.
2. From Nuclear Fear to Petrochemical Boldness
Few technologies have attracted as much scrutiny as nuclear power. From the moment nuclear weapons appeared, governments, military planners, academics and ordinary citizens recognised their destructive potential. Strategic doctrines emerged around deterrence, arms control, proliferation and mutually assured destruction. During the Cold War, schoolchildren practised nuclear drills, governments built shelters, and public debate became saturated with fears of nuclear catastrophe.
The response was understandable. Nuclear weapons possess extraordinary destructive power, and their use could produce consequences on a scale few other technologies can match. Fear therefore encouraged scrutiny. Institutions, treaties, intelligence networks and strategic doctrines were developed to understand and contain nuclear risk.
At the same time, another technological transformation was taking place. Unlike nuclear technologies, petrochemicals did not arrive as a threat. They arrived as a solution. Petrochemical products helped make food cheaper, transportation more accessible, consumer goods more affordable and industrial production more efficient. Their benefits were immediate, visible and widely distributed.
This helps explain why petrochemicals were embraced so readily. In agriculture, synthetic fertilisers became central to modern food production and helped support dramatic increases in cereal yields during the second half of the twentieth century. In manufacturing, plastics moved from specialist uses into everyday life because they were versatile, durable and inexpensive. In transport, petrochemicals did not merely fuel vehicles; they increasingly became the vehicles themselves, from tyres and dashboards to insulation, coatings and synthetic fabrics. Healthcare, construction, packaging, electronics and logistics evolved along similar lines.
Petrochemicals were not adopted because societies sought dependency. They were adopted because they worked. Their usefulness encouraged acceptance, their affordability encouraged expansion, and their profitability gave consumers, corporations and states strong incentives to deepen the system further.
The striking fact, then, is not that societies embraced petrochemicals. Given their advantages, this was understandable. The striking fact is that the dependency created by their success received comparatively little scrutiny.
This matters because petrochemical dependency became far more universal than nuclear power. Only a small number of countries possess nuclear weapons, and most societies do not depend upon them for everyday existence. Petrochemicals are different. Modern food systems, transport networks, manufacturing, healthcare and economic life all depend upon them. Producers and consumers, rich countries and poor countries alike, remain dependent upon them. No one stands outside the system.
Yet despite this universality, petrochemical dependency rarely became the object of scrutiny comparable to that directed towards nuclear technologies. Modern civilisation became highly skilled at analysing destructive power while paying far less attention to material dependency.
Stupid is as stupid does.
The defining stupidity of modern civilisation is not that it feared nuclear weapons or adopted petrochemicals. Both responses were understandable. The stupidity lies in the imbalance that followed. Civilisation devoted enormous intellectual, political and emotional energy to understanding a technology upon which relatively few people depend, while paying far less attention to a dependency upon which almost everyone depends.
Fear focused attention on power. Dependency quietly became the condition of modern life. That condition forms the foundation of everything that follows.
3. No Outside: Why Go to War?
The previous chapter argued that petrochemical dependency has become a universal condition of modern civilisation. No major power stands outside it. If all participants depend upon the same material foundations for food, transport, manufacturing, healthcare and economic life, then an uncomfortable question follows: why would they deliberately increase losses within the system upon which they all depend through war?
The conventional answers refer to power, territory, ideology, resources, security and strategic advantage. Such objectives are assumed to improve a country's position relative to its rivals. Petrochemical civilisation complicates this logic. A country may gain territory, secure resources or weaken an opponent, yet all participants remain dependent upon the same material system. The balance between them may change, but the condition that binds them does not.
In a petrochemical civilization terms, there are only lesser losers and bigger losers. A lesser loser preserves more of its infrastructure, productive capacity and institutional stability while remaining fully dependent on petrochemical civilisation. A bigger loser suffers greater losses while remaining just as dependent on the same system.
This distinction does not erase real differences in outcome. The difference between losing less and losing more can be immense. But it does change how conflict should be understood. War redistributes losses. It does not remove the petrochemical dependency within which those losses occur.
This is the significance of having no outside. No state, bloc or economy stands beyond petrochemical civilisation. The participants cannot fight their way out of the dependency they share. They can only alter how its costs are distributed among them.
Contemporary conflicts illustrate the point in different ways.
Ukraine – Russia
The war between Russia and Ukraine shows how petrochemical civilisation can produce bigger losers on all sides. Ukraine has suffered vast destruction to infrastructure, industry and housing, with reconstruction costs extending far into the future. Russia has absorbed heavy military losses, sanctions, war expenditure and the diversion of productive resources into military production. Europe has faced energy shocks, inflation and higher defence spending after years of reliance on Russian oil and gas.
Yet the war remains embedded in the same petrochemical civilisation that existed before it began. Missiles, drones, vehicles, logistics chains, fertiliser-based agriculture and reconstruction itself all depend upon petrochemical fuels, materials and industrial inputs. The conflict has changed the scale and distribution of losses, but it has not reduced anyone's dependence on the system that sustains them.
From this perspective, Ukraine, Russia and Europe all emerge as bigger losers. The destruction is real, the asymmetries are real, but the dependency remains.
Venezuela – United States
Venezuela illustrates a different pattern. Here the issue is not symmetrical destruction but asymmetrical advantage within a shared dependency. The United States improves its strategic position through greater influence over, or access to, Venezuelan oil and gas resources, while Venezuela loses leverage, income and control over a key source of national power.
That advantage is significant, but it should not be mistaken for escape. Greater access to petrochemical resources does not eliminate petrochemical dependency. It improves one participant's position within it. The United States remains dependent upon petroleum fuels, petrochemical feedstocks, fertilisers and industrial materials for transportation, agriculture, manufacturing and military capacity. Venezuela, despite its losses, remains dependent as well.
In this case, the United States becomes the lesser loser and Venezuela the bigger loser. The advantage is real, but it exists entirely within a dependency neither side has overcome.
Iran – United States and the World
A war involving Iran, the United States and its allies reveals a third pattern: conflict can increase the cost of petrochemical dependency on a global scale without reducing it for anyone. Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical infrastructure are deeply tied to state revenue, exports and domestic economic life. When war damages that infrastructure and tightens sanctions, Iran suffers destruction, lost income, shortages and inflation while remaining dependent on the same oil- and gas-based system.
At the same time, disruption around the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf energy infrastructure pushes up the price of oil, gas and petrochemical feedstocks across the world. Those increases flow quickly into the cost of fuel, fertiliser, plastics and industrial chemicals. The United States and its allies remain dependent on these flows to power their economies, militaries, transport systems and food chains, but must now secure them at higher financial, political and military cost. Energy-importing regions across Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America face higher prices, inflationary pressure and increased risks to food security and economic stability.
From a petrochemical perspective, the war does not reduce dependency. It makes dependency more expensive. Iran becomes a bigger loser through destruction and lost revenues. The United States and its allies become bigger losers through higher costs and heightened vulnerability. Much of the rest of the world becomes a bigger loser as well, as higher energy and petrochemical costs feed into inflation across food, transport, manufacturing and everyday consumption.
The examples differ in geography, politics and scale, but they point towards the same conclusion. Ukraine shows that enormous destruction can occur without reducing dependency. Venezuela shows that improved access to petrochemical resources may change relative position without changing the underlying condition. Iran shows that conflict can raise the cost of petrochemical civilisation for the global economy, without making anyone less dependent upon it.
What changes from case to case is the distribution of losses. What does not change is the dependency itself.
This is what makes the logic of war increasingly difficult to understand within a petrochemical civilisation. Countries may gain territory, lose territory, acquire resources or lose access to them. Governments may rise and fall. Borders may shift. Entire regions may be destabilised. Yet the societies involved continue to move, build, manufacture, consume and fight through the same petrochemical systems as before.
In this sense, stupid is as stupid does. The defining stupidity is not conflict alone. It is the repeated belief that imposing greater losses on others somehow reduces one's own dependence upon the material system that sustains everyone involved. Some become bigger losers and others lesser losers, but the dependency survives untouched.
4. What Would Real Power Look Like?
The previous chapter argued that war redistributes losses without reducing the petrochemical dependency shared by all participants. Countries may gain territory, weaken rivals or improve their strategic position, yet the underlying condition remains unchanged. The dependency survives while the losses are redistributed.
This raises a more fundamental question: what would real power look like in a petrochemical civilisation?
Modern geopolitics usually answers in relative terms. Power is measured by military strength, economic size, territorial control, resource ownership and political influence. These measures undoubtedly matter. They shape a state's position in relation to other states and often determine who becomes a lesser loser and who becomes a bigger loser.
But this is only relative power.
I argue that relative power is the capacity to secure advantages over others within a shared system. It allows a country to shift costs, protect its interests, acquire resources and impose losses on rivals. Yet it does not necessarily reduce dependence on the material systems that make all these actions possible.
In contrast, I also argue that real power should be understood differently. It is not simply the ability to dominate others. It is the reduction of vulnerability to the systems upon which modern life depends. A country becomes more powerful in the deeper sense when it can maintain food production, transportation, industry and political stability even when the systems upon which they depend are disrupted.
From this perspective, many of the strongest states in the world appear less powerful than they seem.
A country may possess the world's most powerful military and still depend upon petrochemical fuels to move it. It may control vast territories and still depend upon petrochemical systems to feed its population. It may dominate global markets and still depend upon petrochemical materials to sustain its industries. The appearance of power can therefore increase while the underlying vulnerability remains much the same.
This is one of the central paradoxes of petrochemical civilisation. States compete for superiority within the system while remaining bound to it. They accumulate wealth, expand military capability and secure access to strategic resources, yet these achievements often deepen their activity inside the dependency rather than loosen its grip.
More military capability requires more fuel, more materials and more industrial production. Larger economies require more transport, more manufacturing and more petrochemical inputs. Even control over oil and gas reserves does not eliminate dependency. It merely improves one participant's position within it.
A country may become stronger relative to its rivals while remaining just as vulnerable to the system that sustains them all. Domination and dependency can therefore coexist. Indeed, petrochemical civilisation appears to make this coexistence normal.
Stupid is as stupid does.
The defining stupidity may not be war alone. It may be the persistent tendency to mistake relative power advantage for real power. Modern civilisation behaves as though imposing costs on others is the highest expression of strength, while paying far less attention to the shared dependencies that continue to constrain everyone involved.
Real power would look different. It would not consist primarily in expanding activity within the dependency, but in reducing vulnerability to it. It would mean greater resilience when critical systems fail, greater flexibility when supplies are disrupted, and greater capacity to preserve material life without escalating exposure to the same underlying constraints. Rather than competing endlessly for position within the dependency, it would seek practical ways to loosen its grip.
Whether such a transformation is possible remains an open question. What is clear is that military strength, economic size, territorial control and resource ownership have not achieved it. The most powerful countries on earth remain deeply dependent upon the same petrochemical civilisation as everyone else.
Modern civilisation continues to mistake being a lesser loser for being powerful. Yet if dependency remains the common condition, then real power can only mean becoming less vulnerable to it.
5. Conclusion: Stupid Is as Stupid Does
Modern civilisation owes an enormous debt to the petrochemical industry. Petrochemical products have helped feed billions of people, expanded access to transportation, lowered the cost of countless goods, improved healthcare, enabled modern manufacturing and supported living standards that previous generations could scarcely imagine. In many respects, petrochemicals have been one of the great success stories of modern civilisation.
The problem is not their success. It is the dependency created by that success. As petrochemical systems became more effective, affordable and integrated into daily life, societies became increasingly reliant upon them. Yet rather than treating that reliance as a central strategic question, modern civilisation continued to pursue power through military competition, territorial conflict, resource struggles and geopolitical rivalry.
The result has been a world populated by lesser losers and bigger losers. Wars, sanctions and resource conflicts redistribute losses while leaving the underlying dependency intact. Power is repeatedly measured by the ability to impose greater losses on others while remaining trapped within the same material condition.
Modern civilisation has become remarkably skilled at producing lesser losers and bigger losers.
It has become far less skilled at asking whether this is a sensible objective.
If no practical alternative to petrochemical civilisation currently exists, and if billions of people continue to depend upon it for food, transportation, healthcare, manufacturing and economic activity, then a more rational question emerges.
Why pursue forms of power that repeatedly generate losses?
Why not focus instead on creating greater prosperity, stability and resilience within the civilisation that already exists?
The petrochemical industry has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to generate material benefits. The challenge for modern civilisation is no longer proving its usefulness. The challenge is deciding whether the future will be organised around the endless redistribution of losses or around the broader distribution of those benefits.
The dependency remains.
What remains uncertain is whether humanity will continue treating that shared condition as a reason for conflict or as a reason for cooperation.
The answer may determine whether petrochemical civilisation produces a future of increasing prosperity or simply a larger collection of lesser losers and bigger losers.
Stupid is as stupid does.
This article is also published at Substack under @melgozaa
#Petrochemicals #Dependency #Power
